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Were British 'Business Cycles' Cyclical? 
Evidence from Historical Statistics, 1700-1913 
I. Introduction 
'Business cycles ' are the sequences of 'recurrent but not periodic' expansions and 
contractions, proposed by Arthur Burns and Wesley Mitchell (1946), 'occurring at 
about the same time in many economic activities ' and varying in duration from one 
to 12 years . 1 This description, which is accepted by most economists, assumes a priori 
that sequences of peaks and troughs in individual time series - the 'specific cycles' 
- occur simultaneously. If so, then these ' comovements' of the 'many activities ' (as 
Zarnowitz, Lucas and others have characterized them) can be marked by a single set 
of 'general ' turning points: the ' reference cycle'. 
It is not clear the extent to which this assumption about business cycles derives from 
empirical evidence. The problem is compounded by the persistence of growth in 
industrial economies since the eighteenth century, which has made it difficult to 
observe cyclical behaviour independently of ' trend' in largely nonstationary time 
series. Burns and Mitchell never entirely trusted their own time-series evidence, 
which actually revealed that in important aspects each episode was 'unique'. As a 
consequence there has always been a degree of uncertainty in the statistical treatment 
of comovements and hence quantitative investigations have often yielded ambiguous 
results. 
In the case of the British economy in the nineteenth century, most historians have 
expressed doubts about the diffusion of fluctuations across the 'many activities' and 
have concluded that they were to a degree heterogeneous and divergent. Reference 
measures - which are essentially univariate - may not therefore be appropriate as 
representations of a phenomenon whose dynamics are multivariate. The usual practice 
IMeasuring Business Cycles p. 3. 
of decomposing time- series data into ' trend' and ' cycle' has also been questioned in 
postwar research, by Kendall and later by Solomou, Aldcroft and Fearon. Either 
approach can be justified only by making a priori identifying assumptions about the 
nature of business cycles . These in turn are only justified if the time- series evidence 
supports comovements. There is moreover the question whether short- run fluctuations 
are asymmetric in their responses to expansions and contractions, and whether cyclical 
components in linear time- series models actually reflect this property. This paper 
proposes to investigate these issues: whether short- run fluctuations in nineteenth 
century UK time-series comove in the absence of the usual identifying assumptions 
and (as assumed by the historiography) evolved as a consequence of industrialization; 
and whether they are asymmetric . 
ll. The Research Background: Evidence and Methodology 
Ashton (1959) argues that eighteenth century instabilities were the product of financial 
crises and natural apocalyptic forces dominated by dearths and plenties in harvest 
yields; but that by the nineteenth century these 'undulations were more regular'. 2 
Aldcroft and Fearon (1972) claim, with reservations , that eighteenth century 
fluctuations 'were shorter and came to an end more abruptly than those of the 
nineteenth' and that those 'of the flfst half of the nineteenth century ... tended to be 
shorter and more frequent than those in the latter half. . . '3 In the same volume Rostow 
supports the evolutionary interpretation: whereas traditional fluctuations had been of 
the ' inventory cycle' type, it was the ' structural ' shift from agriculture to industry that 
led to the diffusion of the 'trade cycle' throughout a broad range of activities between 
1790 and 1914. 
The majority of historians have nevertheless emphasized the heterogeneity of cyclical 
behaviour in the nineteenth century British economy. Matthews (l954a) questions the 
2( 1959) pp. 138, 173 . 
3(1972) pp. 2- 3. 
2 
idea of 'general trade conditions ' in the war period 1790-1815. Matthews (1954b) 
fmds conflicting evidence of 'cyclical ' turning points from 1833 to 1842: the period 
was a 'long, confused and heterogeneous ' contraction with a number of ' complicating 
factors' and 'a good deal of divergence [in] the timing' of the different industrial 
sectors .4 Hughes (1960) describes mixed conditions for the years 1848-1857.5 
Dornbusch and Frenkel (1984) demonstrate that the ' crisis ' of 1847 was atypical of 
the century, and was actually two distinct crises , of different origins , in May and 
October. Rostow (1972) doubts the homogeneity of nineteenth century 'cycles': not 
only were ' no two cycles ... quite the same' but also the character of the episodes 
changed as the economy evolved, giving each episode 'unique historical 
circumstances'.6 Ford (1981) fmds it 'difficult to specify a typical British fluctuation 
or cycle'; each episode had 'unique institutional and geographical features ... apart from 
varied behaviour patterns'.7 Lewis (1978) goes further: after analysing industrial 
production data he concludes that because they carmot predict future from past 
behaviour, ' the movements of industrial production, though wave- like, are not 
cycles '.8 Eichengreen (1983), in a multivariate (VAR) study, fmds evidence of 
structural breaks in the late nineteenth century, which implies changes in the character 
of cycles over time. 
These doubts are also apparent in the output of the National Bureau of Economic 
Research itself. Burns and Mitchell concluded that each 'business cycle is an 
individual ... differing in countless ways from every other'. 9 Gayer, Rostow and 
4(1 954b) pp. 217, 224. 
5(1960) p. 28. 
6(1972) p. 74. 
7(198 1) p. 134. 
8(1978) p. 18. 
9(1946) p. 466. 
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Schwartz (1951) , applying Mitchell' s methodology, found that ' the precise timing of 
minor. . . expansions and contractions [in the nineteenth century UK economy] cannot 
be easily be generalized'; that output might even have increased during the 
'contraction' ; that recovery could have arisen from a variety of conditions, not all of 
which are present in each episode; and that the time-series data suggest that peaks 
were usually spread over several years. 10 Zarnowitz (1992), describes business cycles 
as 'varied, complex and evolving phenomena of both history and . .. dynamics' which 
are intractable to single-cause theories. lI 
There is also unease about methodology, despite continuing reliance on reference 
chronologies and trend- cycle decompositions. The former is accepted as a proxy for 
comovements in the 'many activities'. Beveridge (1944) proposed an index of 
industrial production as a proxy for a British ' trade cycle' from 1785, with an average 
peak-to-peak duration of eight years. Both Rostow (1948) and Gayer, Rostow and 
Schwartz measure peaks and troughs in 'general' conditions, though both distinguish 
'major' from 'minor' episodes. Aldcroft and Fearon (1972) estimate reference peaks 
and troughs in the Deane (1968) UK GNP series. Ford (1981) attempts a similar 
analysis from income, investment and unemployment data. Later work which relies 
on reference-dating (or examines the idea critically) includes Huffman and Lothian 
(1984), who apply Bums and Mitchell's sununary measures , Solomou (1987, 1994) 
and Dimsdale (1990). 
Trend- cycle decompositions and the practice of smoothing data by moving average 
filters are common in postwar attempts to identify historical business cycles . Beveridge 
(1944) fitted a linear time-trend to his data (and then ignored half the peaks and 
troughs in the residual series, as pointed out by Kendall (1946)); Aldcroft and Fearon 
(1972) also detrended their data; and both Feinstein (1972) and Lewis (1978) 
IOYolume 2, p. 614. 
11(1992) p. 9. 
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employed moving-average ftlters to emphasize 'cyclical ' characteristics. Such practices 
have from time to time been questioned. Aldcroft and Fearon (1972) argue that the 
' study of cycles throws up severe problems of defmition and measurement', that the 
'most important of these is the relationship between the cycle and the trend' and that 
it may indeed be that ' because the two are so inextricably linked together [it is] 
impracticable to make any distinction at all . >12 Solomou (1994) comments that the 
trend-cycle decomposition 'procedure makes strong economic and econometric 
assumptions which may be misleading' if incorrect. 13 The time-series literature since 
the 1970s has shown that trend-cycle decompositions and moving-average ftlters can 
induce spurious effects .14 
The trend component is normally modelled as linear, but this cannot be assumed a 
priori. Post- World War IT macroeconomic time series tend to have optimal 
representations which are stationary in ftrst differences rather than about a 
detenninistic time trend, implying that ' trend' and ' cycle' are governed by the same 
data generating process . However the evidence for this in nineteenth century UK data 
is less extensive and at best mixed. Crafts, Leybourne and Mills (1989) have found 
that for three industrial production series, 1700-1913, 'there is no strong evidence 
against analysing [them] as though they are DS [difference-stationary] 
processes .. .'15 On the other hand Crafts and Mills (1995) fmd 'strong evidence' of a 
cyclical component after 1874, but only in the (Crafts-Harley) aggregate; the 
component series are not considered. 16 
12(1972) pp. 4-5. See also Goodwin (1953). 
13(1994) p. 248. 
14The literature on this point is substantial . See inter alia Chan, Haya and Ord (1977), 
Nelson and Kang (1981 ) and Harvey (1989). 
15(1989) p. 49. 
16(1995) p. 19. 
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Such research is designed primarily designed to investigate growth-rate behaviour of 
aggregates. The models are linear and univariate; none explicitly represents 
comovements or assesses nonlinearities in cyclical components for an entire data set, 
in particular the possible asymmetries between the durations of expansions and 
contractions. In the latter case it has been argued, e.g. by Sichel (1993), that linear 
models with symmetric disturbances are inappropriate. 17 
The term 'business cycles ' has become an imprecise vernacular denoting a consensual 
view of short-run fluctuations as recurrent comovements of the majority of economic 
activities ; yet one which appears to have been challenged by much of the historical 
time- series evidence. The scepticism shown by historians of the nineteenth century 
British economy has been of a strength insufficient to offer a serious challenge to the 
consensus. Nor has an objective assessment of the statistical evidence, without the 
standard identifying assumptions, yet been attempted. 
With the possible exception of Solomou, who concentrates on growth-rate swings, 
economists still rely on the 'results' of Burns and Mitchell as a valid empirical 
foundation for business-cycle models . A dependence on reference chronologies which 
assumes that sectoral comovements are present in the data has obscured rather than 
clarified the issue. Evidence supporting the comovement hypothesis does not appear 
incontrovertible. The usual appeal to Bums and Mitchell for empirical verification is 
not sufficient; for Measuring Business Cycles was actually an interim report, its 
discussion limited to hypotheses for further investigation and to problems of 
methodology. Despite examining hundreds of time series, the best the authors could 
do was to establish diffused ' turning zones' rather than sharply defrned clusters of 
peaks and troughs. 18 Furthermore, like Beveridge they 'weeded out' significant 
17(1993) p. 235 . See also the survey of nonlinear time-series models in Mullineux and 
Peng (1993) . 
18(1946) pp. 70- 1. 
6 
numbers of turning points to enforce the confonnity of ' specific cycles' to their own 
a priori computations of the reference cycle, a practice which renders their results 
unreliable for purposes of empirical verification. 19 
Unsatisfactory documentation of comovements thus compromises the historiographical 
foundations of nineteenth century UK business cycles . There exists a possibility, even 
a presumption, that the standard methodology, with its trend-cycle decompositions and 
the 'weeding out' of 'nonconforming ' rurning points, obscures the dynamics of 
empirical behaviour with 'stylized facts ' .10 Indeed divergences appear to be the only 
feature directly observable in time- series data, a point which is at least implicit in 
most of the literature published since Measuring Business Cycles appeared in 1946. 
Stronger evidence of empirical regularities is required if reference dates and 
trend-cycle decompositions are to be permissible as modelling strategies. 
m. Investigation of the Time-Series Evidence: an Assumption-Free Strategy 
The weakness of the existing evidence requires that comovements be treated as 
hypothetical rather than conclusive. Whether business cycles are acrually apparent in 
pre-19 14 British historical data without the standard fIlters and transformations , and 
if so whether they evolved as a consequence of industrialization, cannot be resolved 
by an appeal to the results of previous quantitative research. In the interests of 
objectivity and consistency the identification of turning points must employ rigorous 
mathematical criteria unadulterated either by 'weeding' or by the fIltering and 
decompositions implicit in time- series model s. Moreover the multivariate nature of the 
hypothesis implies that turning points in vectors of variables, rather than in individual 
l~ese methods are described in Ibid., Chapter 4, Section 4. 
20Bums and MitcheLl 's statistical technique is increasingly criticized. For example, 
King and Posser (1994), p. 437, question whether the business cycles identified by this 
method are not merely statistical artifacts . 
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time- series aggregates , are the appropriate basic Wlits of analysis . The relevant 
questions are : 
1. whether the directly- observable fluctuations in nineteenth century British 
economic data are sufficiently homogeneous and conforming to be represented 
by a single set of reference dates or by turning points in an aggregate output 
measure; 
2. whether short- run fluctuations developed into a general cycle during the 
nineteenth century; and 
3. the extent to which expansions and contractions were asymmetric in 
duration. 
Direct observation of the short- run fluctuations known to have existed in the pre- 1914 
period should help to establish whether they can actually be characterized as ' business 
cycles ' . 
The Identification of Turning Points. In accordance with the revised strategy turning 
points are defmed as observable local time- series extrema: formally , an observation X t 
in a time series {Xt} is defmed as a local maximum !ff (Xtt > max{Xt_k , . .. ,Xt-I} 
and (X t > max{Xt• 1 , ••• ,Xt .d) . A local minimum is the mirror image of the above, 
i.e. , with> max{ . .. } replaced by < min{ ... }. In practice each observation is examined 
for evidence ofmaxirnality or minimality within the 'window' length [Xt- k , .. . ,Xt .d, 
from observation k to observation T- k (where T is the final observation in the series) . 
Setting k = 1 gives a minimum specific- cycle duration of two years , which follows the 
Burns and Mitchell criterion as closely as the annual sampling frequency permits . The 
window is hence the set of triplets of data points X t_ 1 ,XI'Xt' l , where t= 1 , ... ,r - l . 
No maximum duration is specified, since turning points according to this defmition 
occur at sufficiently frequent intervals in most economic time series to permit specific 
cycles of the required length to be identified. (Such lengths are not, however, 
guaranteed; see below. ) 
8 
The advantage of a mathematical metric is that it avoids the problem implicit in 
weeding: having to make subjective distinctions between conforming and 
non-conforming turning points. Enforcement of quantitative criteria pennits 
algorithmic implementation via computer programs . 
Historical Data: Coverage and Reliability. Price and output data are available from 
1700 and 1760 respectively. The data sets are: 
Prices: Sauerbeck's (\ 886) , the Statist (1846-1870) and Rousseau' s (\ 938) 
indices , 1815-1860; UK Board of Trade official statistics, 1871-1913; and O'Brien's 
(1985) industrial price indices , 1700-1815 ; 
Output: Hoffman's (1955) industrial production, Feinstein' s (1972) GDP, 
industrial production and GNP (expenditure) estimates, Lewis's (1978) GDP series, 
Feinstein and Pollard's (1988) investment and Crafts and Harley's (1992) revised 
industrial production index .21 
Analysis is by sub- periods 1700- 1760, 1760-1790, 1790-1815, 1820-1860 and 
1855-1913. The Board of Trade and SauerbeckfStatist indices were complied 
contemporaneously; Crafts and Harley's industrial production index is based on 
Hoffman's series with modified weightings . 
Output data are subject to considerable error, as acknowledged throughout the 
literature . Some of the inaccuracies are self- inflicted, as in the Beveridge, Lewis and 
Aldcroft and Fearon estimates, which were 'adjusted' to conform to business-cycle 
priors by the imposition of moving averages and trend-cycle decompositions. 
Feinstein's (1972) ' best guess' at margins of error in his own estimates exceeds ±25 
percent for some output series. 22 He also takes note of business-cycle priors: turning 
21Some of these are obtained from Mitchell (1988): viz., Sauerbeck, Rousseau and 
Board of Trade prices; and Feinstein and Pollard output data. 
22(1 972) pp. 19-21 and Table 1.9. The reliability problem does not disappear in 
post- I 945 national income accounts , even though these are estimated 
contemporaneously. The UK Office of National Statistics, for example, admits to error 
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points are compared to the original reference chronology, proposed by Mitchell and 
Willard Thorp in Business Annals (1926) , and then ' adjusted' to conform to those 
dates . In practice this involves increasing or decreasing levels where the data clash 
with descriptions of trade conditions in the Annals, by ±8 percent on average, while 
leaving mean levels unchanged . 
The dangers in these several 'adjustment' techniques are various, but all risk the 
induction of 'spurious ' peaks and troughs . These data sets are nevertheless included 
despite their shortcomings because they are in widespread use and because they form 
the quantitative basis for the prevailing historiography . 
The Identification of Comovements . Burns and Mitchell insisted that specific cycles 
must comove, ' for if there were no bunching of cyclical turns there would be no 
business cycles answering to our definition' .23 Operationally this must imply that 
component series turn at the same time as the aggregate in each data set, with 
comparatively few leads or lags. The necessary condition for ' bunching ' or clustering 
is therefore that component variables have the same numbers of peaks and troughs as 
their aggregate, without 'weeding' : in effect that aggregates behave as reference series 
for their components. The approach followed here is to determine for each data set 
whether turning- point numbers are equal for all variables and whether they are 
clustered. Possible evolution of behaviour is assessed by the analysis of sub- periods . 
IV. Results 
The turning- point data give an impression of fluctuations that were largely 'confused 
and heterogeneous'. Numbers vary substantially in all data sets, and ' leads' and ' lags' 
are in fact undefmed unless turning points are weeded to enforce conformity with the 
margins of ±2'h percent for GDP, and up to ±71/2 percent for some other series. See 
United Kingdom National Accounts, Sources and Methods, HMSO, third edition. 
23(1946) p. 6 . 
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aggregates . Expansions turn out to be both more diffused and more persistent than 
contractions during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
Variations in Specific-Cycle Lengths. Cornovements require, at the least, that peaks 
and troughs in the principal aggregates largely coincide with those in GDP in any 
sample period. Table 1 lists peaks and troughs in Feinstein's indices of GDP, 
aggregate industrial production and investment, and in the Board of Trade wholesale 
price index, for the period 1855- 1913 . Also shown are the proportions of turning 
points common to GDP and each of the other three series : ftrst, as a proportion of 
total GDP turning points ; and second, as a proportion of the totals for the other series . 
The average speciftc-cycle length for GDP is approximately 7 \4 years, with maximum 
and minimum lengths ten years and two years respectively, all within the parameters 
set by Bums and Mitchell and accepted by most business- cycle analysts . 
Differences between the two measures are an indication of variations in turning-point 
numbers. The degree of comovement, as measured by turning points common to GDP 
and each of the other series, is variable and in some cases the turning points in one 
series do not even have equivalents in the other. As an example, the second measure 
for industrial production is 0.86 - i.e. , all but two of its turning points (marked with 
an asterisk in the table) occur at the same time as those of GDP. Although on the face 
of it this indicates close conformity, the ftgure is misleading; it represents average 
behaviour for the period and hence reflects the ex post perspective. The fust measure 
shows only two-thirds of GDP turning points (marked with a double asterisk) actually 
coinciding with those in industrial production. There is moreover a behavioural 
anomaly in the middle of the period: the four 'extra', i .e. non-equivalent, turning 
points in GDP - 1867, 1868, 1877 and 1878 - would have presented difficulties for 
any ex ante forecast relying on industrial production as a coincident indicator. The 
unweeded coincidence rate for industrial production in the sub-period 1855-1886 was 
only 50 percent of GDP turning points - a result which is effectively random. The 
ex post proportion of 0.67 was only achieved during the last three speciftc cycles, 
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from 1886 to 1908, a pattern which could not have been reliably forecast from the 
experience of the 30 years to 1885 . 
The conformity of the investment aggregate is much weaker by both measures. 
Numbers of common turning points are only 11 percent of GDP totals and only 13 
percent of own turns . No turning points at all are identified in the 16 years from 1886 
to 1902; and so the peak-to- peak duration of 19 years (1883- 1902) exceeds Burns and 
Mitchell ' s stipulated maximum specific- cycle length of 15 years .24 This is an example 
of behaviour with which the standard approach to cycle identification is unable to deal : 
although ' extra' turning points can be weeded out, the 'missing' ones cannot be 
fabricated . 
Turning points in the Board of Trade wholesale price index show little evidence of the 
pro- cyclicality usually assumed by business- cycle analysts . The coincidence 
proportions are low, and prices have a higher frequency of turns than output: 20 of 
these after 1871 against 12 for GDP, equivalent to mean specific- cycle lengths of 41/2 
years and 6Vz years respectively. Divergences between price and output dynamics are 
also apparent in the earlier period, 1760-1860. The coincidence measures for the 
Crafts- Harley aggregate and two price indices, O'Brien' s and Rousseau's, shown in 
Table 2, are in the range 0.08 to 0.25 . 
Variations in turning- point numbers appear to be a property of all data sets . Table 3 
shows this examples for the period 1852-1913 . The program identifies 195 turning 
points for 11 of 13 Feinstein industrial production variables. The expected total if all 
series fluctuated with the aggregate would be a multiple of the number of turning 
points (14) in the aggregate, i.e. 14x 11 = 154. Departures from the expected value can 
be divided into ' extra' and 'missing' turning points, which are shown at the bottom 
of the table . The former are 'extraneous' turns in series with numbers greater than the 
24(1946) p. 58. 
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aggregate, e.g. manufacturing, with 22-14=8 extra; the latter are those in series with 
smaller numbers, e.g. transport and communication, with 14-11 =3 missing. ('Total' 
turns are in effect a net balance of extra and missing numbers .) The ratio of total to 
expected turning points shows an excess of 27 percent for industrial production and 
investment and 17 percent for GDP. Prices have a shortfall of 9 percent. 
Such behaviour in not confmed to the late nineteenth century. As shown in Table 4 
for industrial production, variability increased during the Napoleonic wars . It is close 
to unity from 1820 to 1860, but because the figure is on a net basis the ratio does not 
tell the whole story. An inspection of column 3 reveals considerable variability - 38 
'extra ' and 20 'missing' turning points . The analysis indicates that an evolution to 
conforming cyclical behaviour during the period of industrialization is not supported. 
For industrial prices (Table 5) the ratio is high during the war period because there 
are only two turning points in the aggregate; in the other sub-periods it is less than 
unity, behaviourally similar to later nineteenth century prices . 
Proportions of coincident turning points in component series are low in the period up 
to 1860. Calculations for the first conformity measure are shown in Table 6 for the 
O'Brien and HoffinanfCrafts-Harley variables. The latter increased in the mean 
proportion of coincidences from about one quarter, 1760-1815, to one third, 1820-60. 
Only tobacco shows a natural coincident relation with the aggregate, the two series 
having identical turning points . Prices have mean coincidences of less than 20 percent 
in both sub- periods; the highest, for brewing, is under 50 percent. 
Mean specific-cycle lengths in Feinstein's industrial production and investment 
aggregates are 9 and 8 lA years respectively (from the data in Table 1) . Those in the 
Crafts- Harley aggregate are shorter: 4th years in the period 1760-1815, and 4% years 
from 1820 to 1860 (based on Table 4) . This may appear to lend some support to 
Ashton's view that fluctuations were more frequent in the earlier period; but 
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wUortunately averages tend to obscure variations in behaviour. Moreover the evidence 
of Tables I to 6 clearly does not imply any evolution to a general business cycle. 
The effects of turning-point variation can be summarized as frequency distributions . 
Table 7 shows a sub-period analysis for the Hoffman/Crafts-Harley data to 1860; 
Table 8 gives results for the later nineteenth century. Colwnn I in both tables gives 
the range of possible turning-point numbers occurring in a single year, from zero to 
the maximum number of variables . The other columns show the number of years in 
the sample period in which each frequency occurred. If component series had actually 
comoved with their aggregates, their turning points would be found in the same years 
in which the aggregates reached peaks and troughs . Some years would hence show no 
turning points, while the rest would contain the maximum number, the relative 
frequencies depending upon the behaviour of the aggregate . As shown in Figure I , the 
histogram for such perfectly clustered behaviour would be U-shaped. Of course as has 
been demonstrated empirical specific-cycle lengths diverge substantially. A simulated 
example of such dynamics is shown in Figure 2 for a hypothetical set of six variables 
whose specific cycles are all different, ranging from three to ten years . The effect of 
this is to give the frequency distribution a central peak, i.e., one neither at zero nor 
at the maximum number of turning points . All empirical distributions save 
Hoffman/Crafts- Harley, 1820-1860, have such peaks; and the latter has a flat rather 
than U- shaped distribution. There is thus little evidence of clustering either before or 
after 1820. 
The Problem of Leads and Lags. Although Burns and Mitchell insisted on clustering 
as a necessary condition they conceded that the case for business cycles would not be 
compromised by the presence of some systematic leads and lags .2.5 This presents 
analytical difficulties . Stable timing relations require that each turning point in the 
'reference' series have a direct equivalent in the indicator series, and as has been 
2.5See the NBER bulletin 'Statistical Indicators of Cyclical Revivals' (1938) . 
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established this is not the case. For example, although industrial production turning 
points in 1866 and 1869 have direct equivalents in the GDP series, those in the latter 
in 1867 and 1868 have no equivalent in the fonner. In such instances, which occur 
frequently in these data sets, the timing relation is strictly speaking undefined. Only 
proportions of coincidences can be measured, and as has been demonstrated these are 
weak owing to divergences in specific-cycle dynamics. 
Table 9 gives examples for Feinstein's aggregates. Even when weeded the largely 
coincident relation between GDP and industrial production breaks down and becomes 
a lag relation during the 1880s . The difficulty with the weeding process is that it 
yields a highly stylized result which exaggerates coincidences. As has been shown the 
actual coincidence rate with GDP turning points up to 1886 is little more than 50 
percent, whereas after weeding it jumps to 75 percent (12 out of 16 residual turning 
points). Moreover the 1885 peak in industrial production is a trough in GDP, and such 
out-of-phase behaviour is fairly common in nineteenth century time- series data. 
Conformity of investment to GDP is weak even after weeding, changing from leading 
to lagging to coincident relations several times during the sample period. Of the nine 
turning points which occur in the same years as those of GDP, five - in 1857, 1868, 
1902, 1907 and 1908 - are actually out of phase (see Table 1) . 
Table JO shows the effects of weeding on timing relations for 11 of the 13 Feinstein 
industrial production variables . Manufacturing, for example, jumps from 0.45 to 0.93 . 
Most variables do not show consistent timing relations even when weeded. The only 
natural coincident indicator is a service- sector series, transport and communication, 
nearly three- quarters of whose unweeded turning points coincide with those of the 
aggregate . From columns 3 to 5 it can be seen that even when ' extraneous ' turning 
points are ignored, a single timing relation is dominant in only three cases: the two 
manufacturing series , with over 90 percent coincidences; and transport and 
communication, with 80 percent. The other series are each spread between at least two 
timing relations , e.g ., building, with 57 percent coincidences and 35 percent leads. 
15 
These are in any case obtained only after substantial adjustments : the three 
'coincident' series require first, the weeding out of eight turning points in 
manufacturing to obtain a fit with the aggregate; and second, the removal of two and 
three turning points, respectively, in the aggregate to obtain agreement with the other 
manufacturing and transport and communication series (see Table 3, column 2) . 
Natural timing relations do not occur in these data, and so the Table la results are 
only of interest as an illustration of the pitfalls of the weeding strategy. Because 
different turning points in the aggregate are eliminated in each comparison, no 
common basis of comparability exists across the data set, and the aggregate cannot be 
used as an overall reference series. There is not, for example, a single turning point 
common to all 13 Feinstein industrial production series. The most turning points 
occurring in anyone year is ten, in 1907; the average over the period 1855- 1913 is 
only four per annum. Gas production has no turning points at all. 
Asymmetries and Diffusion. It is acknowledged that the principal dynamic feature of 
the industrial revolution was economic growth.26 In fact , growth has dominated 
short- run fluctuations in the past 200 or so years to the extent that modern quantitative 
business- cycle analysis has come to regard the two phenomena as being governed by 
a single data generating process.27 The time- series literature has shown that secular 
growth may produce asymmetries between the durations of expansions and 
contractions.28 Nearly all the output series in the present study tend to increase in 
levels over time . Table 11 , showing year- on-year changes for industrial production 
series from 1760 to 1913, illustrates this tendency. Percentages of years in which 
26See, for example, Blanchard and Fischer (1989) Chapter 1. 
27See the preface to Niemira and Klein (1994). 
28There are, of course, other types of asymmetry proposed in the literature: 
'steepness', 'deepness ', etc. These are discussed inter alia in Sichel and in Mullineux 
and Peng, op. cit. 
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• 
variables increased are generally higher than those in which they decreased, implying 
that expansions are more diffused and also of longer duration than contractions, both 
in individual variables and in overall terms . The exceptions are in the pre-Waterloo 
period: output of paper and malt rose in under half the years. The sub-period 
arithmetic means rose from 55 to 75 percent of years during the nineteenth century 
(bottom of the second, fourth and sixth columns); so that although the actual rates may 
have fluctuated, growth became more diffused through the economy as the century 
progressed. In fact , aggregate production increased in more than two-thirds of all 
years after 1820 by these calculations. 
Asymmetries between numbers of series expanding and those contracting in a given 
year would thus be expected. Diffusion indices for the Hoffinan/Crafts-Harley and 
Feinstein industrial production data sets, showing the percentages of series rising in 
a given year (Figures 3, 4 and 5), demonstrate this tendency clearly. Years above an 
index level of 50 are those in which a majority of series increased. Visual inspection 
reveals that all graphs are above this level in more years than they are below it. 29 The 
frequencies are shown in Table 12: the first column on each page gives the number 
of series which could have increased or decreased in a given year; the other columns 
show the percent of years in the sample period for each of these possible numbers. 
The first three columns for the Hoffrnan Crafts- Harley series , for example, show that 
in every year between 1760 and 1815 at least one series increased; and that in 7.3 
percent of years none of these series decreased (i.e., the cells in the second and third 
corresponding to the value 0 in the first column) . In 5.5 percent of years all eight 
series increased; but in no year did all decrease. The cumulations of the 
'increases 'columns for both sub-periods give a majority of Hoffinan series (i.e. , five 
or more) increasing in 47.3 of the years between 1760 and 1815 and in 80 percent of 
years between 1820 and 1860 (nine or more) . On the other hand, a majority decreased 
291fie 50 percent level is sometimes used in diffusion research to distinguish years of 
' recession' from those of expansion. See, for example, Simkins (1994) , p. 387. 
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in about one quarter of the years from 1760 to 1815, and in 15 percent of years from 
1820 to 1860. There were thus only half as many years in the period to 1820 in which 
the majority decreased as those in which the majority increased. A majority of 
Feinstein series (seven or more) increased in nearly 80 percent of years from 1855, 
but a majority decreased in only 19 percent of years . These 'diffusion asymmetries ' 
suggest that 'recessions' - years of contraction in the majority - are fewer and hence 
much more difficult to identify and to track than expansions . Such evidence accords 
well with the postwar historiography of the nineteenth century British economy, which 
has found that conditions associated with years of contraction were often 
'heterogeneous and confused '. 
V. Conclusion 
The results presented in this paper clearly show the limitations of the standard 
reference-cycle approach, which is unjustified by the actual dynamics of short-run 
fluctuations and which thus obscures their true nature . When applied to nineteenth 
century British historical data it yields, as Matthews and other have found , a picture 
of behaviour in which the confonnity of specific cycles is tenuous and unpredictable. 
An analysis of historical data free of summary measures and data transformations has 
shown the following: 
1. Reference measures do not capture the divergences in the British economic 
behaviour in the pre-1914 period. In all data sets variations in turning- point numbers 
are greater than those expected if the comovement hypothesis were supported. This 
is so even after data have been adjusted to conform to an a priori reference 
chronology. Confonnity of variables within and across data sets is weak: the example 
of Feinstein's industrial production variables shows the average number of turning 
points per annum to be only four of a possible 13 . Such divergences imply that no 
single variable, aggregate or component, is likely to serve as an adequate reference 
series for a whole data set. 
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2. Although specific cycles lengthened after 1860 there is no evidence of convergence 
to comovement. 'Business cycles' thus do not appear to have evolved with 
industrialization. 
3. In the presence of such variation leads and lags cannot be properly defmed. 
Attempts to do so require weeding which exaggerates the degree of coincidence; yet 
few series , even when weeded, have a dominant timing relation. 
4. Expansions were both more persistent and more diffused than contractions. The 
latter were patchy and so would have been less predictable and less easily identifiable 
as general economic ' recessions' . If, as has been argued, asymmetric behaviour 
implies noniinearity, then models with symmetric disturbances would be unlikely to 
capture the short- run time- series properties of these data. If, on the other hand, 
business cycles are not governed by a data generating process separable from that 
governing long-run behaviour, then linear difference-stationary models may be 
optimal . 
These points merely reinforce the doubts and questions about the nature of short-run 
fluctuations raised by postwar economic historians . The time-series literature still 
hypothesizes, in a phrase of Niemira and K1ein borrowed from Bums and Mitchell, 
a general ' rhythm of business activity', but no evidence of any such phenomenon 
emerges from the time series analysed here. On the contrary, when the various ftiters 
are removed the behavioural divergences - also described by Burns and Mitchell -
are highlighted . Variation in turning-point numbers and the weak conformity of series 
seem to be a feature of all collections of historical variables . The business cycle in the 
UK economy before 1914 therefore appears illusory, and economic historians are 
well- justified in their reservations . These should perhaps have been made operational 
at an earlier stage. 
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TABLE 1 
UK Macroeconomic Aggregates: Peaks and Troughs 1855- 1913 
Feinstein's GDP Feinstein's Industrial Production 
Peaks Troughs Peaks Troughs 
1857** 1858** 1857* 1858* 
1866** 1867 1866* 
1868 1869** 1869* 
1876** 1877 1876* 
1878 1879** 1879* 
1883 1885 1885 1886 
1891 ** 1893** 1891 * 1893* 
1902** 1903** 1902* 1903* 
1907** 1908** 1907* 1908* 
Coincidences with GDP turning points: 0.67 
Coincidences with own turning points: 0.86 
20 
TABLE I (continued) 
Feinstein and Pollard Board of Trade Prices 
Investment 
Peaks Troughs Peaks Troughs 
1857 
1865 1868 
1872 1873 1873 1876 
1877 1880 1877 1879 
1881 1882 1880 1881 




1902 1900 1902 
1907 1904 1905 
1908 1909 1907 1908 
Coincidences with GDP turns : 0.11 0.22 (after 1871) 
Coincidences with own turns : 0.20 
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TABLE 2 
Conformity of Price Auctuations, 1760-1860 
Crafts-Harley Industrial Production O'Brien Industrial Price Index 
Aggregate 1760-1815 1760- 1815 
Peaks Troughs Peaks Troughs 
1761 
1761 1763 1762 1764 
1764 1765 
1767 1768 
1769 1770 1768 1770 
1772 1774 1772 1773 
1778 1779 1777 1781 
1785 1786 1783 1785 




1811 1812 1810 1811 
" Coincidences with industrial production turning points: 0.08 
Coincidences with own turning points: 0.13 
• 
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TABLE 2 (continued) 
Crafts-Harley Industrial Production 
Aggregate 1820- 1860 
Rousseau Price Index 1820-1860 
Peaks Troughs Peaks Troughs 
1822 
1825 1826 1825 
1829 1830 1830 
1831 1833 
1836 1837 1836 1837 
1839 1840 1839 
1841 1842 1843 
1846 1847 1845 1846 
1847 1851 
1854 1855 1856 1857 
1857 1858 1858 1859 
Coincidences with industrial production turning points: 0.25 
Coincidences with own turning points 0.24 
23 
TABLE 3 
Examples of Variations in Turning-point Numbers 
Feinstein' s Industrial Production 
1855- 1913 



















Total! expected 1.27 
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TABLE 3 (continued) 
Lewis GDP Series 1852-1913 Board of Trade Price Series 1871-1913 
Series Nwnber of Series Number of 
Turning Points Turning Points 
GDP 18 Aggregate 20 
Agriculture 27 Textiles 20 
Construction 28 Coal 16 
Distribution 18 Food and Drink 21 
Manufacturing and 26 Animal Products 18 
mining 
Transport of 24 Sugar 17 
Goods 
Shipping 6 Wine 19 
Misc. materials 15 
Corn 17 
Total 147 163 
Expected 126 180 
'Extra' 33 
'Missing' 12 18 
Total/expected 1.17 0.91 
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TABLE 4 
Variations in Turning-point Numbers, 1760-1860: Hoffman/Crafts-Harley 
Industrial Production Series 
Number of Turning Points 
Series 1760-1790 1790- 1815 1820- 1860 
Copper ore 18 8 16 
Cotton yarn 18 13 
Woolen and 16 14 20 
worsted cloth 
Sugar 16 15 24 
Malt 18 17 20 
Paper 18 11 14 
Ocean shipping 14 13 11 
Pig iron and steel 10 
Copper 15 
Shipbuilding 17 
Cotton goods 19 





C-H aggregate 14 9 16 
Total 132 100 265 
Expected 112 72 256 
' Extra' 20 29 38 
'Missing' 0 29 
Total/Expected 1.17 1.39 1.04 
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TABLE 5 
Variations in Turning-point Nwnbers, 1700-1815: O'Brien Industrial Price 
Series 
Nwnber of Turning Points 
Series 1700-1760 1760-1790 1790-1815 
Metals 15 10 12 
Textiles 12 10 1 
Brewing 7 7 4 
Salt 20 9 3 
Coal 21 8 8 
Leather 6 6 5 
Candles 16 10 9 
Construction 27 10 8 
Price index 19 13 2 
Total 143 83 52 
Expected 171 107 18 
' Extra' 11 0 35 
' Missing ' 39 34 
Total/Expected 0.84 0 .71 2.89 
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TABLE 6 
Proportion of Turning Points in Component Series Coinciding with Aggregate 
Turning Points: Analysis by Sub- periods 
O'Brien Industrial Hoffman/Crafts- Harley 
Prices Industrial Production 
Proportion Proportion 
Series 1700-60 1760- 1815 Series 1760- 1815 1820-60 
Metals 0.33 0.14 Copper ore 0.27 0.38 
Textiles 0.25 0.20 Cotton yarn 0.23 
Brewing 0.43 0.36 Woollen 0.39 0.7 
Salt 0.20 0.08 Sugar 0.23 0.27 
Coal 0.05 0.00 Malt 0.35 0.12 
Leather 0.33 0.09 Paper 0.21 0.32 
Candles 0.38 0.17 Ocean shipping 0 .36 0.5 
Constructio 0. 11 0.28 Pig iron and 
n steel 0.33 
Copper 0.26 0.11 
Ship building 0.25 
Cotton goods 0.3 
Silk goods 0.33 
Bread, etc . 0.35 
Tobacco 1.00 
Leather goods 0.55 
Building 0.35 
Mean 0.18 0.14 Mean 0.26 0.33 
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TABLE 7 
Turning-point Frequency Distributions: HoffmanlCrafts-Harley 
Series 1760- 1860 
Number of Sub- period Frequencies 
Turning Points 
1760- 90 1790-1 815 1760-1815 1820-60 
per Anum 
0 2 2 
2 2 4 0 
2 2 3 0 
3 4 3 7 4 
4 6 8 13 4 
5 12 6 18 4 
6 3 2 5 7 
7 2 2 4 4 











Turning-point Frequency Distributions 1852-1913 
Number of Feinstein Industrial Feinstein and Lewis GDP Board of Trade Feinstein GNP 
Turning Points per Production Pollard Investment Prices Expenditure 
Annum 
0 5 4 12 2 4 
4 9 13 3 11 
2 7 8 10 9 30 
3 7 10 6 4 19 
4 9 9 6 5 8 
5 10 7 6 7 8 
6 5 7 7 5 2 
7 6 3 0 4 
8 0 2 






Variations in Timing Relations after Weeding: Feinstein's GDP and Industrial 
Production Aggregates, 1855-1913 
Turning Points Turning Points 
(2) (3) (6) 
(1) Industrial Timing (4) (5) Timing 
GDP Production Relation GDP Investment Relation 
1857 1857 C 1858 1857 Lead 
1858 1858 C 1866 1865 Lead 
1866 1866 C 1869 1868 Lead 
1869 1869 C 1876 1877 Lag 
1876 1876 C 1879 1880 Lag 
1879 1879 C 1883 1883 C 
1883 1885 Lag 1885 1886 Lag 
1885 1886 Lag 1902 1902 C 
1891 1891 C 1908 1907 Lead 
1893 1893 C 
1902 1902 C 
1907 1907 C 
1908 1908 C 
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TABLE 10 
Proportions of Component Turning Points Coinciding, Leading and Lagging Feinstein ' s Industrial Production Aggregate 
1855-1913 
(a) : Proportion of Cb): Proportion of 'Weeded' Turning Points 
'Unweeded' Turning 
Coinciding Leading Lagging Series Points Coinciding 
Building 0.38 0.57 0.35 0.08 
Chemicals 0.22 0.33 0.58 0.09 
Distribution 0.11 0.25 0.25 0.5 
Engineering 0.36 0.57 0.36 0.Q7 
Food 0.32 0.57 0.14 0.29 
Metal 0.11 0.35 0.5 0.15 
Manufacturing 0.45 0.93 0.07 0.00 
Mining 0.35 0.50 0.36 0.14 
Other manufacturing 0.58 0.9 0.1 0.0 
Transport and 0.73 0.8 0.2 0.0 
Communication 
Textiles 0.24 0.43 0.29 0.28 
TABLE 11 
Percentages of Years with Increases in Levels, Industrial Production Data 
Hoffman Crafts/Harley 1760-1815 Hoffman Crafts/Harley 1820-1860 
Series Percent of Years Series Percent of Years 
Increasing Increasing 
Copper ore 61.8 Copper ore 67.5 
Cotton yarn 56.4 Pig iron 75 .0 
Woollen Cloth 58.2 Copper 57.5 
Sugar 40.0 Ship building 55 .0 
Malt 57.2 Cotton goods 80.0 
Paper 43.6 Woollen Cloth 65 .0 
Ocean shipping 58.2 Silk goods 55 .0 
Aggregate 70.9 Bread 65.0 
Sugar 57.5 
Malt 60.0 
Tobacco products 72.5 
Leather 57.5 
Building 95 .0 
Ocean shipping 75.0 
Paper 72.5 
Aggregate 67 .5 
Mean 55.8 67.3 
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TABLE 11 (continued) 














Total industrial production 
Mean 
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Diffusion of Expansions and Contractions in Industrial Production Data 
1760-1913 










Percent of Years with: 
Increases Decreases 
0 7.3 









TABLE 12 (continued) 
Hoffman/Crafts-Harley 1820-1860 
Percent of Years with: 
Number of Series Increases Decreases 
0 0 5.0 
0 2.5 
2 0 7.5 
3 0 2.3 
4 2.5 1.5 
5 7.5 7.5 
6 2.5 17.5 
7 5.0 2.5 
8 2.5 5.0 
9 7.5 7.5 
10 15.0 5.0 
11 12.5 0.0 
12 7.5 2.5 
13 22.5 0.0 
14 7.5 0.0 
15 2.5 0.0 
16 5.0 0.0 
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(7) 
TABLE 12 (continued) 
Feinstein Industrial Production 1855-1913 
Percent of Years with: 
(8) (9) 
Number of Series Increases Decreases 
0 0 15.5 
1.7 22.4 
2 0 12.1 
3 3.4 17.2 
4 3.4 10.3 
5 5.3 1.7 
6 6.8 1.7 
7 0 6.9 
8 5 .2 5.2 
9 12.1 1.7 
10 12.1 3.4 
11 17.2 0.0 
12 20.7 1.7 














Figure 10 Turning- point Frequencies with Perfect Clustering 
(All intennediate freq uencies zero) 
Maximum 


















Figure 2. Turning-point Frequencies with Differing Specific-cycle Lengths 
Simulation ofa nonconforming data set: 
Six series with 3, 4, 5, 6, 8 and 10 year cycle lengths respectively 
o 2 3 4 5 6 
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